1 Part A Proof of Claim 1: θ 1 and θ 2 are private information of jurisdictions 1 and 2, respectively. The appropriate equilibrium concept is thus Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where jurisdictions' equilibrium strategies are functions of their respective fundamentals, or 'types'. Given jurisdiction 2's equilibrium policy choice p 2 (θ 2 ), jurisdiction 1 chooses p 1 to maximize -γ 1 (θ 1 −p 1 ) 2 −(1−γ 1 )E(p 1 −p 2 (θ 2 )) 2 , (A1) where E is the expectation operator. Obtaining and re-arranging the corresponding first-order condition gives
Recognizing that jurisdiction 1's equilibrium strategy is a function of θ 1 and taking expectation with respect to θ 1 on both sides of (A2) yields Ep 1 (θ 1 )=(1−γ 1 )Ep 2 (θ 2 ).
(A3) Following analogous steps as above to characterize jurisdiction 2's equilibrium policy choice gives p 2 =γ 2 θ 2 +(1−γ 2 )Ep 1 (θ 1 ) (A4) and, eventually, Ep 2 (θ 2 )=(1−γ 2 )Ep 1 (θ 1 ).
Given γ 1 , γ 2 ∈(0,1), the system of equations (A5) 
Proof of Claim 2:
The choice of p to maximize E{−ω 1 γ 1 (θ 1 −p) 2 −ω 2 γ 2 (θ 2 −p)
2 } yields the firstorder condition -ω 1 2γ 1 E(θ 1 −p)(−1)−ω 2 2γ 2 E(θ 2 −p)(−1)=0, which, when simplified, gives
With the objective function concave in p, the second-order sufficient condition for a maximum is satisfied.
Derivation of expressions (2a), (2b), (3), (4a), (4b), (5), (6), and (7):
Follows from straightforward algebra using the properties of θ 1 and θ 2 : E(θ 1 )=E(θ 2 )=0, E(θ 1 2 )=σ 1 2 , E(θ 2 2 )=σ 2 2 , and, because θ 1 and θ 2 are independent, E(θ 1 θ 2 )=0.
Proof of Proposition:
Suppose that ν 1 >0. (The proof for the case when ν 2 >0 is analogous and thus omitted.) Then, because ν 1 +ν 2 <0, we know that ν 2 <0. From (7), therefore, d∆>0 if and only if dσ 2 2 /dσ 1 2 >ξ, where ξ=−(γ 2 2 ν 2 )/(γ 1 2 ν 1 )>0. To prove the properties of ξ, let s=(ω 2 /ω 1 ). Note that ν 2 >0 implies s>1. Then, since ν 1 =ω 2 (1−γ 1 )−ω 1 , ν 1 >0 may be expressed as
Also, ξ can be written as
From (A7), it follows that, first,
which is negative given that γ 1 ,γ 2 ∈(0,1). Second,
which is negative by (A6) and since s>1. Third,
which is positive by (A6) and because s>1.
Part B
This appendix analyzes the model as developed in Sections 2 and 3 of the paper while relaxing the assumption that the means of θ 1 and θ 2 respectively equal to zero. Specifically, assume that now Eθ 1 ≡µ 1 ≠0 and Eθ 2 ≡µ 2 ≠0, with µ 1 ≠µ 2 . Thus, σ 1 2 ≡E(θ 1 −µ 1 ) 2 = Eθ 1 2 −µ 1 2 and σ 2 2 ≡E(θ 2 −µ 2 ) 2 = Eθ 2 2 −µ 2 2 . All other assumptions adopted in Sections 2 and 3 continue to hold.
Consider, first, decentralized (anarchic) policy-making. Jurisdiction 1 chooses p 1 to maximize (A1), giving rise to (A2). Recognizing that jurisdiction 1's equilibrium strategy is a function of θ 1 and taking expectation with respect to θ 1 on both sides of (A2) yields:
By symmetry,
Solving the systems of equations (B1) and (B2) for Ep 1 (θ 1 ) and Ep 2 (θ 2 ) and plugging the resulting expressions into (B1) and (B2) gives 2 2 2 1 1
Observe that if µ 1 =µ 2 =0, (B3) and (B4) 
where 2 2 2 1 1 1 
,
where the term J=J(γ 1 ,γ 2 ,ω 1 ,ω 2 ,µ 1 ,µ 2 ) is independent of σ 1 2 and σ 2 2 . Observe that (B9) differs from the expression (3) in the paper by the term J only.
Consider, next, centralized harmonization of policymaking. Acting ex ante, before θ 1 and θ 2 are realized, the supra-jurisdictional authority chooses a uniform policy p to maximize { } 
Obtaining and re-arranging the resulting first-order condition (second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied) gives
